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Triangular Cooperation in East Asia: 
Challenges and Opportunities for 
Japanese Official Development 
Assistance
Jin Sato1
Abstract The article examines the potential contribution of triangular 
cooperation (TrC) as an emerging form of foreign aid. By reviewing the 
Japanese TrC practices, it addresses some critical questions from the 
perspective of national interests, development impact, and ownership. 
Under the declining trend of foreign aid as a form of resource transfer to 
the global South, future TrC should address questions beyond the realm of 
technical cooperation. The article claims that the primary function of TrC is 
to maintain donor relationships with emerging powers that are graduating 
from aid recipient status, while highlighting its potential and limitations 
for promoting TrC among China, South Korea, and Japan.
Keywords: triangular cooperation, East Asia, national interests, Japan, 
technical assistance.
1 Introduction
What role can triangular cooperation (TrC)2 play amidst the declining 
impact of  official development assistance (ODA) relative to other 
sources of  international transfers? What implications does TrC offer in 
light of  the rising presence of  new donors in East Asia such as South 
Korea and China? If  ODA is included in foreign policy derived from 
donor countries’ national interests (Gulrajani 2017), what implications 
are there for TrC that transfers substantial leverage to a third party? 
Exploring these questions from the perspective of  Japanese foreign aid 
is the central topic of  this article. 
The declining proportion of  ODA accompanies the general rise of  
developing countries’ economic power in global production. Today, 
developing countries as a whole produce about half  of  world economic 
output, up from about a third in 1990 (UNDP 2013). Perhaps more 
relevant to this article is the fact that the landscape of  foreign aid is 
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increasingly influenced by new donors, including China, Saudi Arabia, and 
Brazil, which were primarily aid recipients until the 1990s. In fact, many of  
these countries have a long tradition of  foreign assistance; the designation 
‘new donors’ is used here simply to denote that their impact has become 
significant enough to catch the attention of  the traditional Western donors. 
In response to these trends, aid communities led by the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) of  the Organisation for Economic 
Co‑operation and Development (OECD) have not only increased their 
efforts to coordinate with each other through such mechanisms as a 
sector‑wide approach, but they have also started to explore ways to involve 
former aid‑recipient countries as resource providers in project planning, 
financing, and implementation. TrC emerged in this context. One 
important role expected in ODA today for a country such as Japan, which 
has used ODA not only as a development tool but more importantly as a 
diplomatic tool, is for developed countries to maintain their connections 
with middle‑income countries that are graduating from ODA recipient 
status (Lancaster 2010). As will be discussed later in this article, this 
appears to be the main motivation for traditional donors to engage in TrC. 
This article makes three claims pertaining to TrC: (1) TrC is a new 
practice invoked by some donors such as Japan and Germany primarily to 
maintain their relationships with emerging powers; (2) Given the historical 
emergence of  South–South cooperation as an additional alternative 
to North–South aid, the promotion of  South–South cooperation, at 
least in part via TrC, contains inherent contradictions, because it is, in 
principle, an effort by the North to support South–South cooperation; 
and (3) China and South Korea may be too close to each other in various 
aspects of  development cooperation, which points to co‑financing rather 
than TrC in technical cooperation. How one addresses the latter two 
challenges will determine the future of  TrC in East Asia.
A brief  justification of  the treatment of  South Korea towards the end 
of  the article may be needed. The conventional understanding of  TrC 
is to have a Northern country teaming up with a pivotal country (usually 
from the South) and a Southern recipient country. South Korea joined 
the DAC in 2010 and is technically a ‘Northern’ country, yet the key 
element of  TrC is to combine strengths of  countries at various stages 
of  development, possessing a varied aid portfolio to offer. Thus, the 
relative relation between countries is what matters and not the absolute 
classification as North or South. It is in this context that I treat South 
Korea as a pivotal country making up a critical part of  TrC.
2 A brief literature assessment 
While there is a proliferation of  literature on South–South cooperation 
and emerging donors in general, only a few have treated directly the 
question of  TrC. Among the few, Fordelone (2011) argued that although 
TrC is widely practised around the world, further efforts in ownership, 
alignment, and harmonisation are required to promote further 
development effectiveness. Schaaf  (2015) focuses on the rhetoric and 
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reality of  ‘partnership’, which is a central concept embedded in TrC, 
to highlight pitfalls including reductions in effectiveness, difficulties in 
implementation and conflicts of  interest.
However, because the implementing agencies often undertake and 
fund most of  these TrC-related works, research tends to focus more on 
technical and managerial issues than on political ones.3 Most research 
treats TrC as an enhanced form of  South–South cooperation, and it is 
viewed in a positive light. Furthermore, the literature mostly deals with the 
evolution and potential of  this new scheme, often as something separate 
from the conventional bilateral aid that donors have been utilising.
As McEwan and Mawdsley (2012: 1186–87) claim, however, ‘strategic 
and political motivations of  different actors – northern, pivotal and 
recipient – are still poorly understood’ and ‘[p]olicy-oriented analyses 
of  TDC [Trilateral Development Cooperation] are generally reluctant 
to confront explicitly the inherently political nature of  “development” 
and the uneven power relations between different actors enrolled within 
it’ (McEwan and Mawdsley 2012: 1187). This article agrees with these 
authors that the question of  power is central to understanding how aid 
relationships begin, sustain, and evolve. 
By ‘power’, I mean the ability to influence the behaviour of  others. 
However, unlike the conventional assumption that nations compete 
for power and hegemony in international politics, the field of  foreign 
aid has an inherent complication because its aim is in empowering 
others to some extent. The topic of  triangular cooperation is even more 
complicated, since it has a nested structure of  power relations within 
the group of  three. Exclusive focus on the collaborative aspect of  the 
‘triangular’ should not obfuscate the effects it may create in changing or 
maintaining the relationship between the three. 
Alongside an increasing tendency to emphasise security issues under 
the Abe administration in Japan, there has been a strong tendency to 
emphasise ‘national interests’ reflected in the ODA (Gulrajani 2017). 
Because of  the conservative budget, particularly in comparison to the 
expanding defence budget, there is increasing political pressure in Japan 
to recover the explicit link between ODA and national interests to justify 
spending taxpayer money; this political pressure is due in large part to 
the Japanese private sector’s interests. TrC is an interesting theme to 
be discussed in this context, as TrC is apparently a scheme that at least 
partially hands over initiatives to pivotal middle‑income countries. The 
relevant question coming to the fore is how national interests factor into 
TrC calculations.
In short, the literature has shortcomings in the relative absence of  
(1) the critical and political analysis of  triangular cooperation; (2) the 
recipient countries’ perspectives; and (3) the role of  the private sector 
in the implementation processes, which bypasses the inner workings, 
project identification and funding. 
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3 Triangular cooperation in practice
3.1 TrC’s placement in aid policy
While Japan is one of  the few countries along with Spain and Germany 
that has explicitly stipulated TrC policies, this does not mean that TrC is 
given a high place in ODA policy at large (Lengfelder 2016). How much 
importance is given to TrC in the Japanese government’s present ODA 
policy? The ODA Charter of  2003, which has the highest authority, 
touches explicitly on the role of  South–South cooperation under the 
subheading ‘Basic Principles (5): Partnership and Collaboration with the 
International Community’, as follows:
Japan will actively promote South–South cooperation in partnership 
with more advanced developing countries in Asia and other regions. 
Japan will also strengthen collaboration with regional cooperation 
frameworks, and will support region-wide cooperation that 
encompasses several countries (MoFA 2003: 3).
In which areas does Japan find the benefit in TrC? The official 
brochure on TrC produced by the Japan International Cooperation 
Agency (JICA) highlights two points (JICA 2009). The first point 
is the recognition that South–South cooperation is an effective 
tool for developing countries, as countries placed at a similar level 
of  development can offer more relevant ideas based on their own 
development experience. Additionally, Japan had an emotional rationale 
for being an aid recipient in the past, which offered moral strength in its 
justification for engagement with South–South cooperation (Sato 2013). 
It is in this context that Japanese development experts have started 
to tap into Japan as an aid recipient to extract lessons for developing 
countries today, particularly since the 2000s.4 
3.2 Trends in TrC by JICA
Table 1 illustrates the distribution of  trainees who participated in 
JICA’s Third Country Training Program (TCTP), which amounted to 
Table 1 Number of TCTP participants (by region, 2011) 
Number of TCTP participants trained (by regional origin)
Asia–Pacific LAC Middle East Europe SSA Total
Number of TCTP 
participants received
Asia–Pacific 885 15 50 0 279 1,229
LAC* 16 598 0 0 96 710
Middle East** 78 0 647 0 472 1,197
Europe 30 0 28 6 0 64
SSA*** 0 0 0 0 381 381
Total 1,009 613 725 6 1,228 3,581
Notes *Latin America and the Caribbean; **Middle East includes North Africa; ***Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Source JICA (2011).
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3,581 participants in the year 2011. The TCTP is a technical Japanese 
ODA cooperation scheme that takes place in developing countries 
with trainers from neighbouring regions. It is funded by JICA. The 
idea is not just to reduce training costs but also to make the particular 
technology relevant and appropriate to the beneficiaries’ level. Table 1 
demonstrates the general tendency of  training targeted at participants 
in their own region, with JICA’s main activity concentrated in the  
Asia–Pacific region. One should also note that a large number of  
participants from Africa are trained in the Asia–Pacific region as well. 
The training’s content tends to focus on issues particularly relevant to 
the region such as tropical diseases, energy conservation, agricultural 
techniques, and environmental management.
3.3 Patterns of triangular cooperation
Most of  JICA’s TrC consists of  third-country training, where training 
is conducted in pivotal countries with JICA’s funding and support 
(see Figure 1). Very small numbers of  dispatched experts from pivotal 
countries add to the list of  TrC activities occurring. There are four basic 
patterns of  TrC; while the schematic patterns below do not necessarily 
form the shape of  triangles, the figures represent the way multiple 
parties are jointly implementing aid projects.
1. Bilateral TrC integrating Southern country knowledge
This is a pattern wherein JICA mobilises knowledge resources from 
Southern country partners, either through TCTP or third‑country 
expert dispatch in the field, where Japan may not have a comparative 
advantage relevant to the needs of  the beneficiary countries (see 
Figure 2). Capacity Development for Public Administration in Ghana 
was one such project where resources from Singapore, Malaysia, and 
South Africa were called on to improve Ghana’s Civil Service Training 
Centre (Honda, Kato and Shimoda 2013). This pattern’s success 
depends on the extent to which pivotal countries could join forces in 
enhancing the effectiveness of  technical assistance to the beneficiaries. 
Human resource development 
Diffusion of Japanese achievement
Improvement of investment climate
Cost reduction and appropriate technologies
Knowledge-sharing, networking
Assisting middle-income countries to become 
new donors







Figure 1 Elements of Japanese TrC
Source Author’s own, based on MoFA (2013).
Components Examples of functions
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2. Dissemination of best practices information 
This is the most standard form of  TrC conducted by JICA (see 
Figure 3). The training and dispatch of  experts are the typical 
instruments. This pattern can also expand into a regional network of  
knowledge dissemination. Examples include JICA’s assistance both 
in finance and substance to the Kenya Forestry Research Institute, 
which then offered a vocational training programme in Senegal’s 
Vocational Training Center; these activities were built on previous 
bilateral cooperation with Japan (Honda et al. 2013). This scheme gives 
more initiative to the pivotal countries and may evolve into a broader 
programme of  nurturing pivotal countries into becoming donors 
beyond just assistance to a particular sector.
3. Support for South–South cooperation organisational capacity development
By dispatching technical cooperation experts to Southern country 
partners, this pattern expects those partners to disseminate knowledge 
to other Southern country partners (see Figure 4), in the expectation 
that eventually partner countries become donors. Examples of  this 
Figure 2 Bilateral TrC integrating Southern country knowledge
Notes J = Japan; S1 = pivotal countries; S2 = beneficiary countries. The inputs 
represented in the arrows can range from financial contributions to technical transfers 






Figure 3 Dissemination of information on best practices
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pattern include JICA’s assistance to Indonesia in its effort to strengthen 
capacity to provide South–South cooperation (Shimoda and Nakazawa 
2012). This is another form of  TrC that gives more initiative to pivotal 
countries, but with more explicit intentions on the pivotal side to 
become future donors operating projects in multiple recipient countries.
4. Collaborative support by Japan and its Southern development partners
This is a pattern wherein JICA and its Southern country partner(s) 
jointly support a beneficiary country through equal partnership(s) 
(see Figure 5). This type of  collaborative work is sought with new 
donor countries that have already developed their own expertise and 
resources to become donors by themselves. An example of  this is JICA’s 
collaboration with Brazil in assistance for the Mozambique ProSavana 
Project. This scheme is possible only between an emerging donor that 
has independent capacity to implement projects on its own. Because of  
the nearly equal participation by both donors, coordination efforts on 
the ground become critical. 
In short, most of  the TrC by JICA is an extension of  the bilateral 
cooperation that had previously been conducted in the pivotal countries. 
They are extended efforts to tap into the resources nurtured during 
bilateral times. This is the key feature of  TrC that determines the range 
Figure 4 Support for South–South cooperation organisational capacity development








Figure 5 Collaborative support by Japan and its Southern development partners
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of  activities in the Japanese ODA context. TrC, therefore, is more of  a 
scheme to maintain relationships with middle‑income pivotal countries 
that otherwise graduated from Japanese assistance as beneficiary 
countries. It has not been utilised enough as an opportunity to increase 
Japan’s aid portfolio (i.e. the menu of  what Japan can offer as aid) by 
learning from the pivotal countries. 
4 Incentives for cooperation
Why then do countries bother to play the role of  a pivotal country? 
Given that major emerging countries such as Brazil, China, and India 
are all regional powers having the capacity to conduct aid on a bilateral 
basis, one may wonder why such countries would bother to engage 
themselves with TrC.
Knodt and Piefer (2012) addressed this issue systematically. They made 
the point that even among the new donors, a distinction should be 
made between countries that have significant geopolitical importance 
in the global economy, such as Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Indonesia, 
and South Africa, and relatively smaller providers such as Thailand, 
Chile, Malaysia, Colombia, and Vietnam (Knodt and Piefer 2012: 
38). For the regional powers, engaging with traditional donors through 
ODA may be a single tool among many to establish their status; trade, 
investment, and military power may work more effectively towards such 
a goal. However, for the rest of  the pivotal countries, ODA can be a 
vital connection to maintain and enhance their economic and political 
relationships with other developing countries. The incentives to engage 
in TrC differ accordingly. Below is the analysis of  incentives based on 
the donor’s position in the triangle.
Knodt and Piefer (2012) highlight two motivations for these new donors 
to engage in TrC: (1) reducing political tension through the presence of  
a third party; and (2) capacity building to become donors.
First, in countries where political tensions resurge periodically, such as 
those between Thailand and Cambodia, the presence of  traditional donors 
helps soften the tension in implementing projects in such beneficiary 
countries. Through such incentives, the new donors aspire to become 
regional leaders. By including a third party as a catalyst, pivotal countries 
can lessen otherwise sensitive political tensions and build strategic regional 
and inter-regional alliances through the TrC mechanisms.
Second, many new donors have the incentive to become independent 
donors in the future by learning how to plan and implement projects 
through collaboration with traditional donors. As aid officers of  the 
Thailand International Cooperation Agency (TICA) told me,5 it is 
sometimes efficient to learn from jointly implementing projects in a 
third beneficiary country to become independent and capable donors. 
The presence of  this incentive demonstrates that foreign aid is not just 
about meeting needs or providing resources, but more about the actual 
mechanism of  delivery, which requires skills and experience. 
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On the other hand, the new donors’ eagerness to establish independent 
donor status comparable to the DAC donors may create challenges, as 
some new donors still fall short in the financial and human resources 
needed to meet expectations. The TICA, for example, is an entity 
within a key pivotal country aiming to establish itself  as a leading donor 
in Southeast Asia. However, as TICA officials admitted themselves, their 
budget is extremely limited, which hinders their ability to establish a 
truly equal partnership with traditional donors.6 The cost-sharing ratio 
between JICA and its partner countries is one important indicator. A 
survey conducted by Japan’s International Development Center in 2010 
reported that the burden shared by the pivotal countries ranged from 
30 per cent to 50 per cent for Thailand, 50 per cent for Singapore and 
Malaysia, and about 15 per cent for the Philippines (IDC 2010). 
Regarding incentives for traditional donors, as was recently announced 
by the prime minister, Abe Shinzo, in his trip to several Latin American 
countries, Japan made a commitment to provide ODA to countries that 
have already reached ‘graduation’ status from a traditional standard 
based on per capita income. This will probably include Japanese 
support for such middle-income countries to assist their neighbours, 
that is, the seeds of  the triangular scheme. This announcement reveals 
the traditional donors’ incentives in triangular cooperation: some of  
the traditional donors prefer to rely on ODA mechanisms to maintain 
their diplomatic relationships with middle-income countries, which are 
increasing their presence in the global economy. Unlike countries in 
Southeast Asia, which have strong economic relations with Japan, many 
countries in Latin America will have weaker ties with Japan if  all ODA 
pulls out from the region. For traditional donors, maintaining connections 
through ODA with middle‑income countries can be a strong incentive. 
More questionable are the incentives for the beneficiary countries. In 
principle, few countries will turn down offers of  assistance.7 Perhaps the 
only real incentive may be the traditional donors’ financial guarantees 
that stabilise the projects implemented, mainly by the pivotal countries. 
Yet, if  beneficiary countries have already established bilateral relations 
with existing donors, there is no clear reason why they should pursue a 
‘triangular’ form of  foreign assistance. It is for this structural reason, as 
this article addresses below, that each beneficiary country’s ownership 
becomes questionable. 
5 Critical questions for the triangular approach 
Given foreign aid’s political nature and the institutional requirements 
for sustaining the aid business, we must ask the following questions to 
analyse whether TrC has the potential to become a major option in 
foreign aid. Three issues stand out: (1) national interests, (2) development 
impact, and (3) ownership. These are by no means arbitrary (Ashoff 
2010).8 The first question on national interest is particularly serious 
in Japan, where causal relationships between taxpayer money and its 
contribution to benefits in Japan are increasingly voiced under declining 
public expenditure trends. The second question on development impact 
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is an obvious one that requires little explanation. While the promotion 
of  partnerships should be valued, its development impact should be 
assessed separately. Finally, the question of  ownership: who controls the 
process of  TrC projects? We shall examine each of  these below.
5.1 The national interest question
One of  the key questions posed regarding the triangular approach in 
the Japanese context is its connection with national interests. Under the 
new ODA Charter of  2015, which stipulated securing ‘national interests’ 
for the first time as an important goal of  development cooperation, 
the Abe administration has been emphasising how offering a varied 
menu of  international assistance can help enhance Japan’s national 
interests. TrC can easily be classified into the types of  cooperation that 
contribute to national interests through maintaining human channels 
with middle‑income pivotal countries, and more importantly include 
them structurally in the traditional donors’ aid regime. In Japan’s case, 
it has been common practice to hire a foreign consultant who has been 
working with the Japanese counterpart to carry out projects on behalf  
of  the Japanese staff (MoFA 2013).9 It is expected that the utilisation 
of  foreign resources can further enhance Japanese national interests in 
certain areas (such as improving the investment climate in Africa through 
using foreign consultants who know more about the African context).
5.2 The development impact question
The evaluation of  development impacts is one topic that should be 
addressed in discussing each scheme’s desirability. Evaluation faces 
further challenge because most triangular projects by Japan consist 
of  technical assistance emphasising knowledge transfer and training, 
the impacts of  which are difficult to quantify. Given that there are 
no standard ways to measure the development impact of  triangular 
cooperation, JICA discloses only quantitative trends using the number 
of  Japanese experts dispatched to pivotal countries and the number of  
trainees as measurement instruments (Honda 2013). In reality, however, 
many projects are pre-designed by consultants of  donor countries in 
close consultation with the recipient country governments. 
Such realities aside, international recognition of  triangular cooperation’s 
effectiveness seems to be on the rise. The Organisation for Economic 
Co‑operation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) have high regard for this scheme’s 
potential effectiveness (OECD 2011; UNDP 2004). Moreover, Japanese 
TrC projects were awarded the South–South Cooperation Award from 
the United Nations (UN) in November 2012 during the South–South 
Cooperation Expo. We need to examine more closely the nature of  the 
power structure among the nations in which TrC plays a role. 
5.3 Ownership question
One of  the repeated critiques in aid administration is ‘fragmentation’: 
aid received in many small pieces from many donors inviting less 
competition, which can reduce the total effectiveness of  development 
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efforts (Frot and Santiso 2010). From the perspective of  administrative 
efficiency, TrC is complicated, which leads to the question of  ownership. 
In the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ) Conference 
on Triangular Cooperation, 19–20 September 2013, I addressed this 
question to the floor: ‘Has there ever been a triangular project initiated 
by the recipient country?’ There was no response from the audience. 
One cannot overgeneralise from this lack of  response, but it is still 
plausible to infer that there has not been a triangular arrangement 
undertaken on the recipient country’s initiative. Reasonably enough, 
there is no particular reason why a recipient country should make the 
arrangement triangular rather than bilateral. Li and Bonschab agree 
that ownership is one of  the central challenges for effective triangular 
cooperation: ‘It often seems that donors prefer profound discussions 
among themselves, before, in a second step, they look for a recipient 
country for implementation’ (2012: 187).
My interview with a senior GIZ officer found that German citizens in 
general emphasise philanthropy and aid to alleviate poverty.10 Germans 
will support such initiatives even if  their feedback on national interests 
is unclear. Under such circumstances, it is hard to justify continuous 
investment into countries that have already graduated from low‑income 
status. TrC in this sense is a device to justify continuing commitment to 
middle‑income countries, giving them a new role as pivotal countries to 
benefit their poorer neighbours. 
The three questions highlighted above set a certain limitation on 
how the existing structure of  inequality can be reduced among 
the stakeholders of  three countries. While the technologies being 
transferred in the process of  TrC originate from a country that is closer 
in their development stage, there is no explicit mechanism to uplift the 
position of  the beneficiary country. 
6 Implications for East and Northeast Asia
6.1 A perspective on Chinese aid 
As we have seen, Japanese foreign aid’s central feature is its strong 
engagement with the private sector from policy formulation to 
implementation (Sato 2018). Research undertaken in the recipient 
countries of  Chinese aid have found that the private sector also plays a 
significant role in formulating development projects (Sato et al. 2011). 
Perhaps one of  the most highlighted trends affecting the ODA 
landscape is the rise of  China as an economic superpower. Some 
consider Chinese aid a threat, not because of  China’s increasing 
volume of  investments, but rather because of  the alternative norms and 
principles it posits towards beneficiary countries. China is widely viewed 
as providing aid ‘without Western lectures about governance and 
human rights’ (The Economist 2010). Chinese loans, for example, include 
the condition that a proportion must be spent on Chinese contractors, 
equipment, and services, thereby providing capital for Chinese exports 
(Park 2011). While the tying of  aid may therefore result in mutual 
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benefits, a key aspect of  partnership, it contradicts the definition of  
ODA, for which the main objective should be economic development 
and welfare. It also arguably creates more benefits for the donor than 
for poor people in the recipient country. Little progress was made at 
Busan11 on the issue of  tied aid, beyond agreeing a commitment to 
make progress towards an unspecified deadline (Oxfam 2012).
Many commentaries on Chinese aid lack empirical foundation and are 
often based on subjective impressions. However, a firmer ground has 
begun to be prepared. A recent study by Kitano and Harada (2014) 
found that the total volume of  Chinese aid has increased sharply since 
2004, with a rate of  increase of  24 per cent until 2011. China’s net 
foreign aid dropped from US$5.2bn in 2013 to US$5.0bn in 2014 but 
rose to US$5.4bn in 2015 (Kitano 2017). Although its ranking in terms 
of  aid volume had been lower than one would expect, China increased 
rapidly to number six in 2012. Given its constant growth rate, the total 
amount of  China’s aid is expected to surpass the top‑tier DAC members 
in the next few years. 
It is interesting that China is also pursuing a trilateral approach to 
development cooperation. Zhang and Smith (2017) convincingly 
document the recent trend of  China’s seeking partnership with the UN 
and Western donors by putting growing emphasis on its identity as a 
great power in the development sector, using trilateral cooperation to 
build its global image.
6.2 Possibility for collaboration?
Based on the existing practices of  TrC initiated by Japan, this section 
examines the future possibility of  establishing a triangle (or any other 
form of  development cooperation) with Japan’s neighbours: China 
and South Korea. Countries in East Asia, including Taiwan, have been 
most exposed to ODA from Japan and thus should be considered the 
first partners with which Japan could work. Periodic political tensions 
aside, there has already been a substantial record of  cooperation 
between Japan, China, and South Korea in foreign aid. Between the 
Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) of  South Korea 
and JICA, there have been annual meetings held periodically since 
December 2010 – joint training programmes have been implemented 
in the fields of  energy, environment, economic development policy, and 
disaster education. Other notable collaborations include co‑financing 
the Climate Change Mitigation Program in Vietnam, an electronic 
cable extension project in Tanzania, and a road improvement project in 
Mozambique (Sato pers. comm. 2014). 
Japanese collaboration with China is less extensive compared to that 
with South Korea, yet occasional meetings between the concessional 
loan agencies (i.e. Export–Import (Exim) Bank of  China, Korea 
Eximbank’s Economic Development Cooperation Fund, and JICA) 
have been held since 2010. Kitano reports that projects on the ground 
are also beginning, for example, in rice production in African countries, 
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road construction in Tajikistan and urban transport in Kyrgyzstan 
(Kitano 2012). Although political tensions between Japan and China 
have intensified recently, many upcoming joint initiatives continue to be 
implemented on the ground. 
A wealth of  experience in jointly implementing projects with South 
Korea and China, however, does not automatically lead to the proper 
utilisation of  triangular modalities or any other form of  development 
cooperation. Political tensions aside, three specific future challenges 
should be highlighted. First, because of  their geographic and 
cultural proximity, it is often difficult to find areas of  expertise that 
have complementarity. There are agricultural techniques for arid 
environments, for example where expertise from China can be utilised 
to assist countries such as Mongolia, but the list is not extensive. A 
similar condition applies to South Korea. 
The second challenge is that the East Asian neighbours have quickly 
passed through the status of  middle‑income countries to the level that 
requires a partnership arrangement with Japan. Triangular cooperation, 
in a traditional sense, puts them in a resource‑providing status, and 
thus may not be acceptable. Third, because the East Asian region has 
been going through some political tensions, development operations 
requiring long‑term commitments may be seen as being vulnerable and 
thus not worth the effort to make an investment. While ODA activities 
should be treated independently from politics, it is undeniable that the 
circumstances will be heavily influenced by such ups and downs. 
South Korea and China are countries that seek a certain level of  
recognition in the international donor community, though their styles 
may be different. My interview with JICA’s staff12 confirmed that one 
of  China’s key interests is establishing an evaluation scheme to defend 
its approach against Western criticisms.13 Increasing pressure to disclose 
various data and statistics also creates an additional motive to install an 
evaluation scheme that can be an effective communication tool with 
traditional donors and multilateral banks. 
Abundant documentation asserts that both China and South Korea 
adopted and learned from their experiences as major recipients of  
Japanese foreign aid. Brautigam (2009) claimed that Chinese techniques 
such as allowing recipients to pay in-kind (i.e. with raw materials) 
were adopted from the Japanese method in the 1970s.14 The KOICA’s 
administrative system is documented as being modelled after the JICA 
system (Kondoh 2013). Korean policymakers themselves do not hesitate 
to admit that they have ‘copied’ the Japanese aid system, where many 
of  the JICA laws and regulations were translated into Korean as a basis 
for the KOICA (Kim and Seddon 2005: 170). The focus on economic 
infrastructure is another commonality among East Asian donors. In 
Japan, as we have seen, this inclination has a strong link to ODA and 
the private sector implementers. 
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As a vehicle for collaboration, working through international 
organisations can help reduce any tension when political conflicts 
hinder effective collaboration for development assistance. Even the 
recent tendency to create a new economic block by China (represented 
by the agreement to establish the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
in 2015) may enhance China’s accountability and transparency in 
implementing international development projects that must be approved 
collectively by this new bank. Through such regional forums, South 
Korea, China, and Japan could perhaps begin to list some comparative 
advantages, particularly in the field of  technical cooperation, relevant to 
the poorer parts of  the world. 
7 Conclusion
Unlike some Western traditional donors such as the UK, which has 
an inclination to outsource most of  its implementation to private 
actors regardless of  their national origin, JICA has been emphasising 
Japan’s own development experience and capitalising on such assets 
for the purpose of  development in poorer nations. The long tradition 
of  an intimate connection with ministries and private sectors and the 
utilisation of  domestic firms and expertise under ‘tied aid’ represent 
one such legacy. This experience‑based approach has a strong affinity 
to TrC, which is also experience‑based; TrC is not usually made out 
of  random combinations of  three actors with respective expertise, but 
is rather a development of  existing partnerships and the accumulated 
knowledge based on such partnerships. 
South–South cooperation’s significance will inevitably expand as the 
influence of  non‑DAC donors increases. This will have significant 
impact on the process of  the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 
as it expects wider participation from the actors in developing countries 
who were mostly outside the scope of  the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs). As we have seen in the examples above, TrC is 
particularly suitable for including private actors as pivotal agents 
soliciting investments from the donor countries. It is thus critical for 
private sectors to integrate SDGs into their business and employment 
practices, particularly in the field of  gender and environment where 
such private investments will have direct impact.
TrC will have a positive impact on the efficiency as well as the 
effectiveness of  development cooperation in the long run, if  not 
immediately, because its main feature is to nurture middle-income 
countries to become effective donors in the future. Despite such 
promising features, however, I found a number of  reasons why this 
may not prevail as a dominant mode of  development aid in the context 
of  Japanese ODA. The main reasons why TrC does not quite take off 
on the scale that it should is because the Japanese system places more 
emphasis on prior clearance at the administrative level, and because 
personnel shift their positions every two or three years, which limits 
any project’s smooth continuity. Despite these vulnerabilities, Japan 
wishes to support TrC not because of  its potential effectiveness (and 
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cost savings), but also because it may become the pivotal mechanism 
to maintain connections with middle‑income countries; Japan invested 
substantially through ODA in the past. 
TrC involves three main actors. The stylised format, however, should 
not be the preoccupation. A more important dimension is the initiative 
and ownership in the configuration of  multiple stakeholders. The 
clear point is that the development scene will increasingly be coloured 
by a network of  actors rather than bilateral donors. If  such a trend is 
confirmed, what we need is fertile soil to allow different combinations of  
resources and expertise for the purposes of  international development. 
Various forums of  human resources exchanges, interactions, and 
training may be a strong way to enrich this soil, which can turn into 
concrete triangular projects in the future, if  not immediately. 
As the number of  donors multiplies with the increased participation 
of  non‑DAC members, what becomes increasingly important is the 
beneficiary countries’ absorptive capacity. If  TrC has the tendency to 
leave behind the interests of  the beneficiary countries, as this article 
argues, traditional bilateral aid should continue to assume a key role 
in capacity development in less developed countries. Discussion on the 
way to enrich TrC should go hand in hand with the appropriate role of  
traditional bilateral aid, which should address more directly the needs 
of  the poorer countries. 
Notes
1 University of  Tokyo.
2 ‘Triangular cooperation’ is commonly defined as ‘joint projects in 
development cooperation among established and newly emerged 
donors within the new global context’ (Li and Bonschab 2012: 
185). This article defines TrC as ‘a partnership between DAC 
[Development Assistance Committee] donors and providers of  
South–South cooperation to implement development cooperation 
projects in beneficiary countries’ (Fordelone 2011: 4), as DAC donors 
carry common norms regarding general objectives and means of  
development despite diversity in country allocation and preferred 
modalities. 
3 Major publications by implementing agencies include Honda (2013), 
UN (2012), BMZ (2013), and MoFA (2013).
4 A typical example of  a research topic along this line is the application 
of  the kaizen (improvement) approach in enhancing the efficiency and 
working conditions of  employers in developing countries (Higuchi, 
Nam and Sonbe 2015).
5 Mr Amornchewin Banchong, interview, 22 August 2016.
6 Mr Amornchewin Banchong, interview, 22 August 2016.
7 Offers to assist in emergencies such as natural disasters may 
be refused, particularly by middle-income countries, owing to 
insufficient capacity to receive and handle incoming aid in short 
periods of  time. Thailand’s initial refusal of  foreign aid during the 
2004 tsunami is one such example. 
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8 Ashoff (2010) highlights related risks pertaining to TrC such as 
lowering quality standards, neglecting beneficiary countries, 
increasing transaction costs and fragmentation.
9 The Triangle of  Hope was a project (August 2009 to August 2012) to 
enhance the investment climate in Zambia; it was implemented by a 
consultant from Malaysia.
10 Anon., interview, 20 September 2013.
11 The Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness took place in 
Busan, South Korea, in 2011.
12 Anon., interview, 20 April 2017.
13 While China has been severely restrictive in disclosing information 
on its foreign aid activities, there is a sign of  change represented 
by its recent White Papers on foreign aid. China published its first 
White Paper in April 2011 and a second in July 2014 (UNDP 2014). 
While there is no description of  specific projects, the two White 
Papers demonstrate the trend that China is willing to disclose more 
information on its aid activities.
14 See Watanabe (2013) for a detailed study on how China learned from 
its major foreign aid donors, i.e. the Soviet Union and Japan.
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